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INTRODUCTION 
After the annexation of Crimea, in his Address to the Federal Assembly in 2014, President 
Putin declared that 'Crimea is where our people live' and Crimea and Sevastopol 'have 
invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia' (Putin, 2014a). In the current 
literature on RussLDQ IRUHLJQSROLF\5XVVLD¶V DQQH[DWLRQZDVVHHQDV 
WKH UHWXUQ WR HPSLUH

*ULJDVD
OHJLWLPL]DWLRQRIWKH.UHPOLQ¶VVWDWXVTXR
*RRGHDQG/DUXHOOHRU
'imperial' (Ioffe, 2014). Although this literature explains the imperial tendencies of the Russian 
VWDWH¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\RXWFRPHV, it lacks a discussion of the civilizational claims of the state 
and tends to ignore how this is central to great power politics. Drawing upon and extending 
current debates on the sources of Russian foreign policy, this article asks: How do we 
understand the discourse of 'our people' and 'civilizational importance' in the study of Russian 
foreign policy? This article is concerned with the discourse of civilizational nationalism and 
argues that Russian foreign policy, and actions towards Ukraine, can be understood through 
WKH RQJRLQJ SROLWLFDO XVH RI WKH P\WK RI 5XVVLD DQG 5XVVLDQ µJUHDWQHVV¶ DQG
cultural/civilizational superiority. To explore this, the article focuses on how civilizational 
nationalism is driving foreign policy towards Ukraine. 
'XULQJ3XWLQ¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ, the discourse of Russian civilization and the myth of greatness 
have been embodied in various foreign policy decisions. Although the recent Crimean crisis 
was the first time that Russia claimed to defend the rights of 'Russkii' (ethnic Russians) 
explicitly abroad, there has been a telling slippage between ethnic and civic nationalism in 
official speeches. For instance, in the South Ossetia war in 2008, Russia claimed that the rights 
of 'Rossiiskii' (Russian citizens) were at risk. On the other hand, in his address to the Federal 
Assembly after the annexation of Crimea, he referred to Russians in ethnic terms. Although 
there is a slippage between ethnic and civilizational nationalism in the official discourse, ethnic 
QDWLRQDOLVP FRQVWLWXWHV DQG FRQWULEXWHV WR ZLGHU 5XVVLDQ µFLYLOL]DWLRQ¶ ,Q VRPH RIILFLDO
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documents this resulted in including Ukrainians in the wider Russian civilization. However, 
HOVHZKHUH8NUDLQHZDVUHSUHVHQWHGDVµ/LWWOH%URWKHU¶WRJUHDWHU5XVVLDZKLFKUHIHUUHGWRWKH
people of Ukraine as secondary to wider Russian civilization. Thus, this article is concerned 
ZLWKFRQWLQXLW\VHHDOVR7RP&DVLHU/XNiã7LFKǤ, 2017) in Russian foreign policy, even 
in times of uncertainty, and this continuity explains Russian foreign policy rather than the 
discourse change in the 2014 speech, as some scholars argue. 
In the IR and area studies literature, scholars have already shown an interest in 'the Russian 
idea', 'national idea', patriotism, nationalism/patriotism, patriotic rhetoric and ideology in 
Russian domestic and foreign policies (Breslauer, 2009; March, 2007; March, 2012; Laruelle, 
2009; Laruelle et al 2010; Laruelle et al 2012; Lucas, 2008; Luke, 2012; Panov, 2010; 
Shnirelman, 2=LHJOHU.ROVW¡DQG%ODNNLVUXG¶VUHFHQWVWXG\DOVRZRUNVRQ3XWLQ¶V
Crimean speech and Russian nationalism (2016). In the study of Russian nationalism, there are 
fascinating discussions on the imperial legacy of Russian nationalism (Pain, 2016), not ethnic 
but imperial nationalism (Mitrofanova, 2016), imperial and ethnonationalism discussion 
(Kolstø, 2016), ethnic Russian great power nationalism (Alexseev, 2016), and the boundaries 
between civic and ethnic nationalism (Blakkisrud, 2016).  
Following this literature, this article aims to extend these discussions by suggesting an extended 
conceptual framework for the study of official nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is defined in 
this article as nationalism which refers to ethnic Russians in the country and excludes the other 
nationals. After the breakup of the USSR, Russian leaders were cautious about using this term 
in their speeches. They preferred using civic nationalism and promoted patriotism which 
includes all nations in the country regardless of their ethnic background. However, after 2006, 
civilizational nationalism was actively introduced to replace civic nationalism to emphasise the 
greatness of Russian culture, heritage and civilization. Civilizational nationalism was often 
utilised by Russian leadership to glorify 1000 years of history, great Russian culture and 
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civilization. However, it is uncertain as to who is included and excluded within this greatness. 
I argue that ethnic nationalism is blended within the myth of the greatness of Russia, 
civilization and the Orthodox Church. The Russian state has utilised the discourse of 
civilization as a project to include people in the country, while ethnic origins of citizens were 
still present and important. For instance, the Russian state often defended the rights of people 
within the dominance of Russian culture. Moreover, Russian culture and language are seen as 
the contributors to civilizational nationalism where ethnic Russians are the main drivers. 
$OWKRXJK3XWLQ¶VVSHHFKZDVVHHQDVDWurn to ethnic nationalism, nationalism was not 
ERUQZLWKWKHFROODSVHRIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQµLWH[LVWHGXQGHUQHDWKDQGLQLW¶/DUXHOOH
For instance, all Soviet citizens had to carry their passports with them which indicated their 
ethnic identity (Kolstø, 2016, 42). 
To explore the current importance of civilizational nationalism to Russian foreign policy, this 
DUWLFOH GUDZV +LVWRULFDO ,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVW +, DQG FRQVWUXFWLYLVW DSSURDFKHV WR SODFH µP\WK
PDNLQJ¶LQDQDSSURSULDWHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W7Ke article argues that civilizational nationalism 
has become the main discourse of the Russian state in reference to how they 'narrate the nation' 
(Bhabha, 1990). Since 2000, the official discourse in Russia often referenced Russian unique 
culture and civilization, and civilizational discourse became useful for elites as a tool of state 
(re)making. HI sheds a light on explaining how the Russian state structured formal/informal 
institutions to maintain the myth of greatness. This has become more important in domestic 
and foreign policies and it has been utilised in the making of foreign policy towards the post-
soviet states. Thus, this has become the main official ideology of the Russian state, promoting 
greatness of Russian culture and civilization.  
Two meanLQJVRIµ5XVVLDQV¶LQWKH5XVVLDQODQJXDJH 
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In the Russian language, there are two words which are used to refer to Russians. One is 
'Rossiiskii' which refers to Russian citizens; the other is 'Russkii' which refers to ethnic Russians. 
Since the break up of the Soviet Union, the successive presidents were cautious about referring 
to Russians in the country as citizens, and they often utilised Russian nationalism as in civic 
terms. It is true that the Crimean crisis was the first time that the Russian leaders claimed to 
defend the rights of ethnic Russians (Russkii) abroad. However, this article argues that the 
Russian state blended statism with a mythologizing of Russian history and civilization. For 
instance, in an article Putin wrote: 
The Russian people are state-builders, as evidenced by the existence of Russia. 
Civilizational identity is based on preserving the dominance of Russian culture, 
although this culture is represented not only by ethnic Russians, but by all the 
holders of this identity, regardless of their ethnicity (Putin, 2012a). 
 
 
Some scholars argue that the traditional civic, multi-ethnic identity of Russia was shifted 
towards an ethnic-cultural core which was transformed into Russianness (Blakkisrud, 2016, 
250). This Russianness, importantly, is still imperial, focusing on ethnic Russians as the 
civilizing/leading group. This was historically led by the Russian state through certain 
institutions. For instance, then-Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov promoted 'sovereign 
democracy' in 2006 which rests XSRQ5XVVLD¶VRZQFLYLOL]DWLRQDOSDWKDQGKRZWKHFRXQWU\
should follow its own way of democracy. Moreover, in 2007 Putin signed a decree on the 
establishment of 'Russkiy Mir' (Russian World). The Russkiy Mir foundation defined their 
mission as: 'to promote understanding and peace in the world by supporting, enhancing and 
encouraging the appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture' (Russkiy Mir 
Foundation, 2016).  The reference to language and culture here marks a particular shift, because 
the claim of civilizational nationalism starts to rest on the active improvement of Russian 
people and through the promotion of a Russian culture. This was central to the way that tensions 
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emerged between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 when then-president Medvedev accused Ukraine 
of being anti-Russian.  
In order to understand the relationship between civilizational nationalism and foreign policy, 
this article forwards three interrelated themes: ethnicity, civilization and statism. These themes 
have been chosen 1) regarding their usage and emphasis in presidential speeches; 2) because 
of their interconnections with one another.  All the themes analysed here form the official state 
ideology in Russia and contribute to the recovery of the nation according to official 
understanding. Civilization emphasises the historical discourse of a great lineage of Russian 
history and culture which is both unique and in need of preservation. What I want to emphasise 
in using civilization in connection with nationalism and statism, is how the greatness of Russian 
culture is not only structured through formal/informal institutions, but also how claims to 
civilization work to strengthen and shape state power. Whilst civilization can allude to ethnicity, 
I treat it as a separate analytical category which emphasises how Soviet politics relies on a 
more explicit shift from the usage of civic and ethnic terms of nationalism. The power of a 
discourse of ethnicity not only strengthens appeals to civilization, but an emphasis on the 
µ5XVVLDQSHRSOH¶RIWHQZRUNVWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHVWDWLVWGLVFRXUVHDQGWKHLGHDOWKDW5XVVLDQVKDYH
a special miVVLRQLQ(XUDVLDDVµVWDWHEXLOGHUV¶ 
The article is divided into three sections. In the first section, the article discusses what it 
understands by nations and nationalism. In the second section, it will turn to the themes on 
ethnicity, civilization and statism. In the last section, it will look at the civilizational 
QDWLRQDOLVPLQWKHZDNHRI&ULPHDDQGKRZ8NUDLQHLVGHILQHGDVµ/LWWOH%URWKHU¶ 
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 
Before turning to a more specific discussion of Russia and Ukraine, we need to ask how do we 
understand nations and nationalism? As an ideology and social movement, nationalism 
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emerged at WKH HQG RI WKH HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\ g]NÕUÕPOÕ   $V ZHOO DV D GRFWULQH
(Kedourie, 1994, 1), LW ZDV DOVR GHILQHG DV ³DQ LGHRORJLFDO PRYHPHQW IRU Dttaining and 
PDLQWDLQLQJWKHDXWRQRP\XQLW\DQGLGHQWLW\RIDQDWLRQ´6PLWKS7KLVDUWLFOH
GUDZVRQg]NÕUÕPOÕ¶VGLVFXUVLYHSRVLWLRQZKLFKREVHUYHVKRZ
QDWLRQDOLVPLVDGLVFRXUVHWKDW
constantly shapes our consciousness and the way we constitute the meaning of the world' 
g]NÕUÕPOÕ+HUHDQG
WKHUHLVQRWKLQJRXWVLGHRIGLVFRXUVH
&DPSEHOO 
,IZHGHILQHQDWLRQDOLVPDVDGLVFRXUVHZKDWDUHWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILW"g]NÕUÕPOÕDUJXHVWKDW
there are three main characteristics: 1) it claims that the interests and values of the nation 
override all other interests and values; 2) it regards the nation as the only source of legitimacy; 
3) it operates through binary division ± EHWZHHQ µXV¶ DQG µWKHP¶ µIULHQGV¶ DQG
µIRHV¶g]NÕUÕPOÕ  S  7KH GLVFRXUVH RI QDWLRQDOLVP LV ZRUWK H[SORULQJ EHFDXVH
traditions, customs and institutions of an ethnic community are constantly reconstructed (Smith, 
  'XULQJ WKLV UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ PRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ g]NÕUÕPOÕ DUJXHV WKDW LW is the 

GLVFRXUVH
RIQDWLRQDOLVPWKDWUHFRQVWUXFWVDQGUHLQWHUSUHWVPRGHUQFXOWXUHVg]NÕUÕPOÕ
221). Studying the official discourse of Russian elites and leaders, this article analyses the 
official documents by Russian leaders (Putin, Medvedev), and articles (Putin and Surkov), in 
RUGHUWRWHDVHRXWZKDWLVEHLQJµUHFRQVWUXFWHG¶DQGWKHSROLWLFDOZRUNWKLVGRHV 
If nationalism is a discourse, how then do we understand the nation and its members? The 
discourse of nationalism defines cultural collectivities as a 'nation' and the members of these 
FROOHFWLYLWLHVDV
FLWL]HQV
g]NÕUÕPOÕ7RRWKHUVFKRODUVa nation is 'a named human 
population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (Smith, 1991, 
 +RZHYHU WKLV DUWLFOH EHOLHYHV WKDW WKH QDWLRQ ³LV DQ LPDJLQHG SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\´
(Anderson, 1991, 6) and then we can say that nationalist discourse can be based on constructed 
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refer to the constructed 'historical past' of the country as a way of unifying the nation. Arguably, 
political ideological discourse can reactivate 'a common sense' which can be extracted from 
national identity (Finlayson, 1998, 102). Here, it is important to understand how 'common 
sense' normalises certain configurations of identity, and certain historical constricts and myths 
DVERWKµQDWXUDO¶DQGµJLYHQ¶ 
+HUH LW LV ZRUWK WXUQLQJ WR &DPSEHOO¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW 
,GHQWLW\ LV QRW IL[HG E\
QDWXUH«'LIIHUHQFHLVFRQVWLWXWHGLQUHODWLRQWRLGHQWLW\«DVHOIIURPWKHRWKHUDGRPHVWLFIURP
a foreign' (Campbell, 1992, 8). This is why the theory of nationalism should study the 
construction and reconstruction of national identities as well as the rhetoric and ideologies 
(Norman, 1999, 56). The rhetoric of nationalism is not only important for 'imposing a collective 
sense of belonging on disparate individuals' (Malik, 1996, 218), but also for political 
FRPPXQLWLHV 6PLWK GHILQHV µQDWLRQDO¶ LGHQWLW\ 
ZKLFK LQYROYHV VRPH VHQVH RI SROLWLFDO
community' (Smith, 1991, 9), and he also defines political community as common institutions 
and some codes of rights for the community (p. 8).  
If we understand national identity as a common culture including myths and memories (Smith, 
1991, 14), we can argue that cultural nationalism promotes these collectivities to construct 
national consciousness. National identity and nations have some components as ethnic, cultural, 
territorial, economic and legal-political (Smith, 1991, 1) and states define political identity 
because their success is largely dependent upon it (Tickner, 1996, 153). However, this is not to 
claim that these components are fixed or given to the nation, but instead produced through the 
discourse of nationalism itself.   
If a nation is an imagined community and nationalism is a discourse to reconstruct and 
reinterpret this imagination, how do we then understand the references to Russian civilization? 
I propose that nationalism is a statist and instrumental construct in Russia, and civilizational 
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nationalism is a particular assemblage of elements that fulfils certain political functions for the 
Russian state. While studying state nationalism in Russia, this article proposes that 
FLYLOL]DWLRQDO GLVFRXUVH LV WKH FRUHRI WKH5XVVLDQ VWDWH¶V LGHRORJ\ LQ LWV IUDPLQJRI IRUHLJQ
policy towards post-soviet states, particularly Ukraine. Especially after the Maidan crisis, the 
Russian state blamed Ukraine for following anti-Russian policies. However, this was not the 
first time that Russian leaders had accused Ukraine of following anti-Russian policies. This 
also happened in 2009 when then-president Medvedev wrote a letter to Yushchenko accusing 
the leader of being 'anti-Russian' (BBC, 2009; Russia Today, 2009; Schwirtz, 2009). By anti-
Russian policies, the Russian leaders made reference to Russian language and Russian culture. 
This discourse is important, not only to interpret the wider foreign policy, EXWDOVR5XVVLD¶V
imperial claims in the post-Soviet space. In order to sketch out this analysis in more detail 
below, I analyse the official documents by Russian leaders (Putin, Medvedev) and their popular 
articles (Putin and Surkov). By analysing these documents, this author reviews Addresses to 
the Federal Assembly from 2000 to 2014, articles by Putin in several Russian newspapers and 
articles of the former Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov. 
The next section will discuss ethnicity, civilization and statism and how these themes have 
become the determinants of the official discourse in Russia.  
Ethnicity and Civilization  
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnicity has been used very carefully by the Russian 
leaders. Yeltsin had preferred to refer to the nation more in civic than in ethnic terms. In his 
Addresses to the Federal Assembly, Putin also referred to people in Russia in civic terms. 
However, there has been slippage between the terms of ethnic and civic Russians in official 
state discourses. Before moving onto these, it is worth defining the nation in Russia. In the 
literature, there are three forms of definitions of nation in Russia: Russia as a community of 
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ethnic Russians, as a community of Eastern Slavs or as a community of Russian speakers. 
Shevel argues that they depend on cultural rather than political principles and this is why these 
can still be defined as ethnic rather than civic (2011, 180). Either civic or ethnic, nationalism 
is motivated by the idea of building a nation. Verkhovsky argues that there are two cases where 
nationalism can be successful: either with the idea of social modernization (as in the French 
revolution) or institutionalising the state (2009, 89). In Russia, nationalism has become 
successful by maintaining state mechanisms and institutionalizing the formal and informal 
structures. 
Regarding the ethnicity question and identity question of Russians, there were two main 
existential questions during the 19th and 20th centuries by Russian intellectuals: 'Is the historical 
path of Russia the same as that of Western Europe, or has Russia a special path of its own with 
its civilization belonging to another type?' (Berdyaev, 1947, 39). According to these two 
intellectual movemHQWV6ODYRSKLOHVDQG:HVWHUQL]HUVWKH6ODYRSKLOHVEHOLHYHGLQ5XVVLD¶V
unique way of development and viewed Russia as unique and separate, whereas Westernizers 
believed in the need to follow Western civilization for cultural/political development and 
wanted Russia to be part of Western civilization (Sputnik, 2010; Bayer, 2012). Moreover, 
DFFRUGLQJWRVRPHVFKRODUVWKH6ODYRSKLOHV¶HIIRUWVZHUHDQDWWHPSWWRVROYHWKHLGHQWLW\FULVHV
in the country; in this sense it was a project for social change (Rabow-Edling, 2006, 2). This is 
why Rabow-Edling argues that it can be best understood when this debate is situated in cultural 
nationalism.  
If the questions around national identity are crucial to study the political discourse in Russia, 
what were the intellectual discussions in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s? According 
WR6HUJH\.DUDJDQRY5XVVLD¶VPRVWFULWLFDOIRUHLJQSROLF\SUREOHPKDVEHHQWKHXQUHVROYHG
question of which is more important: economic development and prosperity, which lay the 
foundation for future influence, or current prestige ± prestige that is often ephemeral 
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.DUDJDQRY  .DUDJDQRY¶V VWDWHPHQW DERYH KDV EHHQ WKH PDLQ GHEDWH DPRQJst 
intellectuals since 1991. As well as these questions, in an article the former Secretary of 
Defence in 1998, Sergey Kokoshin, discussed the question of whether Russia is a superpower 
or a great power (Kokoshin, 2002, 12)   
In his article, entitled 'Russia in Search of Itself', Sergey Stankevich discusses foreign policy 
and how Russia is in search of itself in the international system. He argues that 'dealings with 
the surrounding world are helping shape Russian statehood and helping Russia recognise its 
LQWHUHVWV
 :LWK DQ RSSRUWXQLVWLF SUDJPDWLVP LQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DFFRUGLQJ WR KLP 5XVVLD¶V
missLRQVKRXOGEH
FRQFLOLDWRUFRQQHFWLQJDQGFRPELQLQJ
+HDOVRPHQWLRQHGWKDWLWLV5XVVLD¶V
long-term strategic interest to have special ties with the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) (Stankevich, 1992, 47). Thus, intellectual discussions around RXVVLD¶VEHORQJLQJHLWKHU
to the West or the East, or whether they self-identify themselves as European or Eurasians 
(White et al, 2005), have constructed the contemporary debates by the Russian elites.  
Karaganov and Vladislavlev in their article also discuss 'the Russian idea'. To them, 'Russia 
has a unique historical chance to frame an integral national-interests-oriented policy capable of 
filling the vacuum of ideas and power' (Karaganov and Vladislavlev, 1992, 32). Thus, the 
discussions in the 19th and 20th centuries became known as Atlanticist and Eurasianist. 
However, Stenkevich supports the idea that Russia needs a new balance within Eastern and 
Western orientations (Stankevich, 1992). From this point of view, being a negotiator was seen 
DV5XVVLD¶VPission between the West and the CIS.  
Although Russian leaders often condemned all sorts of ethnic nationalism and promoted civic 
nationalism, this article proposes that this was constructed around the myth of 'greatness of 
Russia' and 'Russian culture'. The existential discussions and civilizational debate over 
Russians belonging eiWKHUWRWKH(DVWRUWKH:HVWDOVROHGWRZDUGVHWKQLF5XVVLDQV¶PLVVLRQV
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towards other nationals in the country. In one of his articles published in 2012, Putin stated that 
'The great mission of Russians (ethnic) is to unite and bind our civilization' (Putin, 2012b). In 
this form of idealisation 'Russians are viewed as the people of great historical mission, as those 
who inherited special spirituality' (Panov, 2010, 92). This kind of historical mission dates back 
WR5XVVLD¶V-year-ROGWUDGLWLRQVDQGWKHHPSKDVLVRQ5XVVLD¶VYDOXHVFXOWXUDOVSLULWXDO
and moral) and consists of both nationalist and conservative elements (March, 2012, 405). 
In his article Putin states 'The core, the binding fabric of this unique civilization ± is the Russian 
(Russkie) people, Russian (Russkaya) culture' (Putin, 2012b). Thus, Putin was suggesting a 
unifying Russian culture with a unique civilization only by the Russkii who have a 'civilizing 
mission' among other ethnic groups. In his Address to the Federal Assembly in 2005, without 
referring to ethnic Russians, Putin emphasized this 'civilizing mission' in Eurasia: 'Russia 
should continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent' (Putin, 2005). This mission 
has not been affiliated with any ethnic groups in the country, but with Russia itself. The next 
section will be concerned with the structuring of state institutions through the myth of the 
greatness of Russia.  
Statism  
During the 2000s, Putin utilised formal and informal institutions to build stability in the country. 
As it was an attempt to mobilise Russian society, this kind of patriotism should be analysed as 
an ideology (Laruelle, 2009, 1). As Laruelle argues, it is important to see that nationalism and 
nationalist ideas are not new to Russia and it is not an opposition to the soviet regime but a 
continuation of it (Laruelle, 2009, 2). Her argument is important to discuss the construction of 
ideas within historical context. 
If we look DW WKH LGHDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH 5XVVLDQ SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH ZRUOG LW ZDV µWKH QHFHVVDU\
psychological protection and support of the nation through centuries of bitter struggle for its 
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YHU\VXUYLYDO¶$UEDWRY7R$UEDWRYLWZDVDOVRSDUWRIWKH
FRORQLDOFonsciousness' of 
DQDWLRQWKDWZDQWVWRH[WHQGLWVFLYLOL]DWLRQWRWKHXQGHYHORSHGQDWLRQVDQGFRXQWULHV3XWLQ¶V
IRUHLJQSROLFLHV
KDYHEHHQLQIRUPHGE\DSHUFHSWLRQRI5XVVLD¶VQHZ-found strength and by an 
emotion akin to resentment ± a nationalism that is driven by a pervasive and strong sense of 
grievance' (Breslauer, 2009, 370). As stated in the Millennium speech, and later on in his 
articles, for the stability of the country, Putin believed in strong state. March argues that 
DOWKRXJKVWDWLVWV¶IRUHLJQ policy is not fully nationalistic, its central part is. This statist rhetoric 
represents great power status almost as a 'national mission, and it sees itself in quasi-
nationalistic emotional and even spiritual terms' (March, 2014, 18). 
How then is the construction of the greatness of Russian culture structured in formal/informal 
institutions? In 2006, Putin officially endorsed sovereign democracy as the government's 
RIILFLDOLGHRORJ\0LMQVVHQRUDV=LHJOHUSXWVLWµVRYHUHLJQGHPRFUDF\LVFORVHly 
WLHGWRWKHLGHRORJ\RIJUHDWSRZHUVWDWXVDQGLPSHULDOGHVLJQV¶)RULPSOHPHQWLQJ
this idea, the regime adopted µvertical power¶ where state power was structured by a top-down 
approach. As well as the Russian leaders, the Kremlin ideologists often referred to Russian 
civilization. In his articles and speeches, he defends 'Russian civilization' as being part of 
'European civilization' but only 'in a specific Russian version of that civilization' (Surkov, 2010, 
11). In this specific version Russia needs to practise its own way of understanding based on its 
RZQSROLWLFDOFXOWXUH+HUHPLQGVWKH5XVVLDQHOLWHVQRWWRORVH5XVVLD¶VRZQVHOI-identification: 

ZH VKRXOGQ¶W ORVH RXU VHOI-LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZH VKRXOGQ¶W EH GLVVROYHG, DQG ZH VKRXOGQ¶W EH
receiving external direction' (Surkov, 2010, 81). For the implementation of this Russian way 
of democracy, "vertical power, QRZZLWKDQµLGHRORJ\¶DFFHSWHGIXOO\E\WKHSHRSOH´QHHGVWR
be enriched (Surkov, 2010, 78). 
In the discourse of nationalism, Russian presidents often emphasised the greatness of Russian 
culture, civilization, and patriotism. Suny argues that in the earliest years of the Soviet Union, 
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the Bolsheviks were speaking of backward or uncivilized people and Russians were the more 
civilized (SXQ\2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VJUHDWQHVVKDVDOVREHHQGLVFXVVHG
GXULQJ3XWLQ¶VWHQXUHZKHUHLWKDVEHHQVHHQDV
*UHDWHU2ULHQW
/X]\DQLQRU
FLYLOL]HG
nation'. It is this perception which holds itself and its civilization 'unique' and desires to extend 
this civilization to the other CIS countries which are in its own perception less civilized or 
already inseparable from Russian culture. 
As well as cultural civilization, in a later article Putin discusses the idea that 'state civilization' 
will unite all the ethnic groups in Russia only within a common language and culture and 'this 
kind of civilizational identity is based on preserving the dominance of Russian culture' (Putin, 
2012a). State civilization, in his eyes, is 'reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, 
Russian culture, the 5XVVLDQ2UWKRGR[&KXUFKDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VRWKHUWUDGLWLRQDOUHOLJLRQV,W
is precisely the state-civilization model that has shaped our state polity' (Putin, 2013a). 
In the reference of Russian culture and civilization, the Russian presidents utilised formal and 
informal structures to strengthen state power. One of the most important institutions, arguably, 
has been the Russian Church. The Orthodox Church was banned in the Soviet Union for years. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, the new Patriarch in Russia received a new position. The 
Orthodox Church has become an important institution for the mobilisation of people and 
legitimising state power. It is important both because it has an agenda outside Russian 
territories, and has regular meetings with the foreign ministry in Russia (Barry, 2012). 
Particularly in his first term, and at some occasions in the second, 'Putin has used Orthodoxy 
as a platform for unifying the Russian state ± as opposed to the nation' (Admiraal, 2009, 205).  
In structuring a national identity and constructing political collectivities, national symbols, 
customs and ceremonies are the most important aspects of nationalism (Smith, 1991, 77). As 
well as the other Soviet symbols - such as the Soviet anthem and the Soviet flag - Putin used 
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Orthodoxy more than Yeltsin (March, 2007, 46). The Church has become a subordinate power 
which supports the state and its institutions. The patriarch has not only become an important 
figure who supports all state policies, he also strengthens the power of embedded ideas within 
the institutions. Thus, the patriarch would not only praise the foreign ministry for their support 
on foreign policy (Sputnik, 2014), but would also expresses his concerns over the recent crisis 
with Ukraine (Higgins 2014). 
Antoine Arjakovsky, director of research at the College des Bernardins in Paris and founder of 
the Institute of Ecumenical Studies in Lviv, VDLG ³)RU WKHP UHIHUULQJ WR 3XWLQ DQG WKH
patriarch), democracy is a danger. They invented a new mythology, the new ideology of 
'Russkymir,
 RI WKH 5XVVLDQ LGHD ZKLFK ZRXOG LQYHQW D NLQG RI QHZ WKHRORJ\ RI SROLWLFV´
(Kishkovsky, 2014). 
In the construction of the greatness of Russia and its civilization, the Orthodox Church played 
an important role. The patriarch often praised the president and state power. He once declared 
3XWLQ¶VHUDDVWKH
0LUDFOHRI*RG
LQ)RXVWDQGFULWLFLVHGKLVRSSRQHQWV%U\DQVNL
2012). He was also supported by the Russian elites and ministers as well. In 2008, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, stated that:   
It is impossible to overestimate the contribution of the Primate of the Church to 
strengthening the positions of our Fatherland in the world and enhancing the 
international prestige of Russia. His firm stand for the preservation of moral 
principles in politics and for the promotion of understanding between peoples 
and civilizations is, undoubtedly, an important part of his legacy (Lavrov, 2008). 
 
The next section will discuss the annexation of Crimea and nationalist discourse through 
ethnicity, civilization and statism.  
Civilizational nationalism in the wake of Crimea and Ukraine as 'little brother' 
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Self-determination of the Russian (ethnic) people ± a poly-ethnic civilization, 
KHOGWRJHWKHUE\D5XVVLDQFXOWXUDOFRUH«WKHFLYLOL]DWLRQDOLGHQWLW\LVEDVHG
on the preservation of a Russian (ethnic) cultural dominance, which follows not 
RQO\IURPHWKQLF5XVVLDQV«7KLVLVWKHFXOWXUDOFRGH3XWLQE 
 
 
How are we then to understand these themes through the annexation of Crimea? In their 
addresses to the Federal Assembly, Putin and Medvedev often emphasised 'to strengthen the 
state' (Putin, 2001, 2004), 'the greatness of Russia' (Putin, 2003), 'the effective state system' 
3XWLQ  5XVVLD¶V JUHDW KLVWRU\ DQG FXOWXUH 0HGYHGHY  3XWLQ  
patriotism (Putin, 2003, 2012c, 2013b; Medvedev, 2008), 'patriotic upbringing' (Medvedev, 
2010). The two leaders not only focused on both the greatness of Russia and the state, but also 
RIWHQUHIHUUHGWRWKHJUHDW5XVVLDQFLYLOL]DWLRQDQG5XVVLD¶VFLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQLQWKHSRVW-soviet 
space. In his reference to civilization, Putin stated that 'For centuries, Russia developed as a 
multi-ethnic nation, a civilization-state bonded by the Russian people, Russian language and 
Russian culture native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse 
world' (Putin, 2012c). Thus, the core of this speech was the implication that the greatness of 
Russian culture would bind the people of Russia with the Russian language. On the other hand, 
in 2014 he added Christianity as part of the unifying force:  
In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their 
material culture, a cRPPRQWHUULWRU\«&KULVWLDQLW\ZDVDSRZHUIXOVSLULWXDO
unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast 
(DVWHUQ6ODYLFZRUOG LQ WKHFUHDWLRQRID5XVVLDQQDWLRQDQG5XVVLDQ VWDWH´
(Putin, 2014b).  
 
These references to civilization are quite crucial to understand the discourse of the Russian 
state since 2000. As well as Putin, Medvedev also referred to Russian civilization:  
I think it could hardly be otherwise when we are talking about a people with 
more than a thousand years of history, a people that have developed and 
brought civilization to a vast territory, created a unique culture and built up 
powerful economic and military potential, a people who act on the solid basis 
of values and  ideals that have taken shape over the centuries and stood the test 
of time (Medvedev, 2008). 
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This civilizational discourse becaPHPRUHREYLRXVZLWK8NUDLQH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRMRLQWKH(8DQG
NATO in 2004. Ukraine stated its intention to be part of NATO after the presidential elections 
in 2004. After the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2007, relations worsened. In 2008 the 
State Duma declared that Russia should withdraw from the friendship treaty with Ukraine 
(RFE/RL, 2008) in response to the membership Action Plan of NATO. Following this proposal, 
former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov discussed returning Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia: 
'We should terminate the friendship treaty in any case, regardless of whether Ukraine will enter 
NATO or not' (Unian, 2008). 
Among the other states of the region, Ukraine is more important for several reasons. First, it is 
mythologized as the birth place of the Russian state (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 156). 
KievanRus is the medieval state of Eastern Slavs and the predecessor of modern Ukraine, 
Russia and Belarus between the 9th and 12th centuries. The importance of KievanRus has been 
mentioned many times by the presidents of Russia (Putin, 2013b). Moreover, in 2013, Putin 
and Yanukovich celebrated the 1,025th anniversary of the conversion to Christianity of 
KievanRus (RFE/RL, 2013). Bogomolov and Lytvynenko argue that for Russia, Ukraine is 
'more than a foreign policy priority; it is an existential imperative' (2012). Moreover, to many 
HOLWHVWKHFRXQWU\LVVHHQDV 
SDUWRIWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VRZQLGHQWLW\
UDWKer than being a 

IRUHLJQVSDFH
7KXV5XVVLDQOHDGHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIJUHDWHUFLYLOL]DWLRQDQG5XVVLDQFXOWXUH
ZHUHEHWUD\HGE\8NUDLQH¶VLQWHQWLRQVWRMRLQWKH(8$IWHUWKH2UDQJH5HYROXWLRQWKLV
was articulated in a different way. Shnirelman argues, for instance, that part of the Russian 
myth is being the 'elderly brother'. This myth considers Russians as civilizers 'who were obliged 
to share their material and intellectual resources generously with all non-Russians, who were 
treated as relatively backward' (Shnirelman, 2009, 137). Thus, this nationalist discourse and 
WKHHPSKDVLVRI5XVVLD¶VJUHDWQHVVQRWRQO\DOORZHGWKH5XVVLDQVWDWHWRLQFUHDVHLWVFRQWUROLQ
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the post-soviet space, but also aimed to mobilise the Russian nation under the umbrella of great 
Russia. But this was interrupted in 2004, 2010 and 2014.  
It should be noted that the perception towards Ukrainians as a Little Brother within Greater 
Russia, and the importance of KievanRus, have been emphasised by Russian leaders many 
times and this kind of understanding has an impact on Russian foreign policy. For instance, in 
3XWLQWKHQ3ULPH0LQLVWHUYLVLWHG$QWRQ'HQLNLQ¶VJUDYHLQ0RVFRZDQGWROGMRXUQDOLVWV
to read his diaries (Marson, 2009; Palmer 2009). The important point about this speech was his 
UHIHUHQFHWR8NUDLQHDVµ/LWWOH5XVVLD¶3XWLQVDLG
+H'HQLNLQKDVDGLVFXVVLRQWKHUHDERXW
Big Russia and Little Russia ² Ukraine. He says that no one should be allowed to interfere in 
relations between us; they have always been the business of Russia itself ' (Marson, 2009). 
This is why Ukraine (which is culturally, politically and historically bonded with Russia) is not 
seen as a different space in Russian society and not mentioned as a foreign space in the political 
discourse of the Russian presidents and elites. For instance, Putin gave an interview to Channel 
One and the Associated Press on September 3rd. In this interview he stated that:  
 You know, no matter what happens, and wherever Ukraine goes, anyway 
we shall meet soPHWLPHDQGVRPHZKHUH:K\"%HFDXVHZHDUHRQHQDWLRQ«$V
far as this part of Ukraine is concerned, it is a territory and we understand and 
remember that we were born, as I said, from the unified Ukrainian Dnieper 
baptistery, Russia was born there and we all come from there (Putin, 2013c).  
 
,QKLV DUWLFOH 
'HFRQVWUXFWLQJ3XWLQRQ8NUDLQH
 0RW\O DQDO\VHV3XWLQ¶V VSHHFK DQGKRZKH
referred to Ukraine as a land not a territory. He argues that 'Putin comes across believing that 
Ukraine is just a place, populated by people who resemble Russians, and not an independent 
VWDWHZLWKDQDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\RI LWVRZQ
 0RW\O7KLVSHUFHSWLRQXQGHUSLQV5XVVLD¶V
attitude towards Ukraine.  
According to Tor Bukkvoll, Russia has never fully recognised the independence of Ukraine, 
which has affected its foreign policy towards the country (Yafimava, 2011 p. 142). Especially 
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among Russian communists and radical nationalists, Ukrainian independence has been 
perceived as a temporary development (Bukkvoll, 2001, 1142). 
Russian perceptions towards Ukraine became more obvious after the NATO-Russia Summit in 
Bucharest in April 2008, as the cable noted the conversation between Bush and Putin. The 
FDEOHUHFRUGHG
<RXGRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG*HRUJHWKDW8NUDLQHLVQRWHYHQDVWDWH
0DUVRQ, 2009) 
'What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us' 
3XWLQWROG%XVKZKRVXSSRUWV8NUDLQH¶VPHPEHUVKLSWR1$720DUVRQ7KHSHUFHSWLRQ
of not seeing Ukraine as a sovereign country or as a country that has been given by Russia had 
an effect on the natural gas policy when the two countries disagreed on the prices of natural 
gas. At the same meeting, 3XWLQIXUWKHUVWDWHGWKDWµWKH&ULPHDZDVVLPSO\JLYHQWR8NUDLQHE\
a decision of the Politburo of WKH6RYLHW&RPPXQLVW3DUW\&HQWUDO&RPPLWWHH7KHUHKDYHQ¶W
even been any state procedures regarding the transfer of the territory, since we take a very calm 
DQGUHVSRQVLEOHDSSURDFKWRWKHSUREOHP¶.\LY3RVW 
In 2009, Medvedev wrote a letter to Yushchenko accusing the leader of being 'anti -Russian'. 
In his letter, he says that Ukraine is 'to sever existing economic ties with Russia, primarily in 
the field of energy' and 'further efforts are being made to remove the Russian language from 
public life, science, education, culture, mass media and courts' (BBC, 2009; Russia Today, 
2009). In an article, Putin stated:  
Russia can and must play a deserving role, dictated by its civilizational 
model, great history, geography, and its cultural genome, which seamlessly 
combines the fundamentals of European civilization and the centuries-old 
experience of  cooperation with the East, where new centres of economic power 
and political influence are currently rapidly developing (Putin, 2012d).  
 
This kind of referHQFH WR µGHYHORSLQJ 5XVVLDQ FLYLOL]DWLRQ¶ KDV DOVR EHHQ VHHQ DV KLV µQHZ
LGHRORJ\¶E\RWKHUVFKRODUV3DQDULQ 
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CONCLUSION  
,QKLV$GGUHVV WR WKH)HGHUDO$VVHPEO\LQ3XWLQUHIHUUHGWRSHRSOHLQ&ULPHDDVµRXU
SHRSOH¶DQGHPSKDVLVHGWKHFLYLOL]ational importance of Crimea and Sevastopol. The discourse 
on the myth of civilizational and greatness of Russia become more obvious with the annexation 
of Crimea, but we have also observed this in presidential speeches and articles since 2000. 
After 2000, the main purpose of the new state had been to revive the greatness of Russian 
culture and spiritual values. As Russian culture and Russian civilization were seen as the 
unifying force,so language, culture and Christianity were seen as the main indicators. This 
article argues that the discourse of civilizational nationalism is crucial in understanding Russian 
foreign policy towards Ukraine. As this paper draws upon a historical institutionalist 
framework, it claims that the civilizational nationalism and superiority of Russian civilization 
have been adopted by the Russian leadership as guiding principles which provide a way of 
structuring the state in order to establish stability within the country. But centring Russian 
culture at the core of Russian civilization, and defining Russians as natural builders of state 
power, is a claim that has been utilised by the Russian state to provide intervention in other 
countries.   
This form of nationalism embedded in formal/informal structures and the Russian state was 
configured as the main protector of this civilization. The Russian leaders have utilised the 
GLVFRXUVHRIFLYLOL]DWLRQDOQDWLRQDOLVPWRµXQLI\¶WKHQDWLRQVRISRVW-soviet regions, particularly 
Ukraine, under the umbrella of great Russian culture, language and 1000 years of history. The 
OHDGHUVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRµ5XVVLDQSHRSOH¶LQFLYLFWHUPVRossiiskii), but, as we have seen after 
the annexation of Crimea, Putin used Ruskkii in his reference to people in Crimea. The state 
proposed sovereign democracy which reframes the importance of the cultural superiority. The 
state, as the main protector of this superiority, also proposed state civilization which would 
unite all ethnic groups in Russia only with a common language and common culture. In the 
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case of the MaidaQFULVLV8NUDLQH¶VHIIRUWV WREHSDUWRI WKH(8Zere seen as a betrayal to 
5XVVLDQOHDGHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIFRQVWUXFWLQJDJUHDWHU5XVVLDQFLYLOL]DWLRQZKHUH5XVVLDQVDUH
going to be the core of them all. 
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